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STEVENS’S RATCHET: WHEN THE COURT
SHOULD DECIDE NOT TO DECIDE
Joel A. Flaxman * †
Hidden underneath the racy death penalty issues in Kansas v. Marsh
lurks a seemingly dull procedural issue addressed only in separate opinions
by Justices Stevens and Scalia: whether the Court should have heard the
case in the first place. As he did in three cases from the Court’s 2005 term,
Justice Stevens argued in Marsh that the Court has no legitimate interest in
reviewing state court decisions that overprotect federal constitutional rights.
Instead, the Supreme Court should exercise its certiorari power to tip the
scales against states and in favor of individuals. Granting certiorari in
Marsh, Stevens argued, was not motivated by a desire to create uniformity
in interpretation of federal law, but was motivated by “[n]othing more than
an interest in facilitating the imposition of the death penalty.”
Justice Scalia vehemently disagreed, writing that Stevens’s argument
rested on a “misguided view of federalism” and ignored the need for integrity and uniformity of federal law. He believes that would create a “crazy
quilt,” in which each state could interpret the federal Constitution as it saw
fit so long each such interpretation gave individuals more protection than
necessary.
“Crazy quilt” is certainly an exaggeration, but there is no denying that
Justice Stevens’s proposal would give states new power in federal constitutional interpretation. This new power is reminiscent of Justice Brennan’s
conception of Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a one-way ratchet. Congress, Justice Brennan explained
in Katzenbach v. Morgan, is within its enforcement powers when it grants
citizens rights greater than those required by the Constitution and the Court
should not intervene even if the rights granted are contrary to its precedent.
Only when Congress attempts to move in the other direction—to infringe
upon constitutionally protected rights—should the Court get involved.
Justice Stevens’s argument, which I will call Stevens’s Ratchet, originated
in the Justice’s dissenting opinion in a 1983 case, Michigan v. Long. In Long
the Court greatly increased its ability to review state court decisions that may
have rested on either federal or state grounds by presuming that, absent a clear
statement to the contrary, such decisions do not rest upon an independent state
law ground and can be reviewed by the Court. In his dissent, Justice Stevens
argued against the Court’s new presumption not only as bad law, but also as
bad policy. The Court’s scarce resources, he wrote, should not be used when a
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state complains that the state court has interpreted federal rights too broadly.
Describing the case as one that concerned the relationship between two
sovereigns, Justice Stevens compared it to a prosecution that occurred in
Finland rather than in Michigan. The United States might be concerned with
procedure in a Finnish court that resulted in the conviction of an American,
but not if it resulted in an acquittal. So too, the Supreme Court should only
review state court decisions when a citizen’s constitutional rights have been
violated, not when they have been over-enforced.
In his Long dissent, Justice Stevens hoped that the Court would one day
reconsider its expansion of its jurisdiction over state court decisions, but as
Marsh shows, there has been no such reconsideration. Since 1983, Justice
Stevens has repeatedly found himself dissenting in such cases. Before the
Court’s 2005 term, these dissents came once every few years, but in the most
recent term Stevens was moved to remind the Court of his view in three different cases: Marsh, Washington v. Recuenco, and Brigham City v. Stuart.
In his Marsh dissent, Justice Stevens quoted liberally from a similar dissent he wrote in California v. Ramos, decided on the same day as Long. In
Ramos, Justice Stevens had argued that the Court should not have reviewed
a decision by the California Supreme Court which held unconstitutional a
jury instruction informing jurors of the Governor’s power to commute a life
sentence without parole. To apply his reasoning from Ramos to Marsh, Justice Stevens had only to reproduce seven passages from his Ramos dissent
and substitute “Kansas” for “California.” In both cases, Justice Stevens suggested that the Court’s decision to grant certiorari was not motivated by a
desire to answer a question of federal constitutional law, but by a desire to
ease the imposition of the death penalty.
Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Brigham City v. Stuart is unique among
opinions expressing the Ratchet because he did not disagree with the Court’s
ultimate holding. Stevens concurred in the Court’s unanimous judgment—a
simple holding that police had not violated the Fourth Amendment—but as
he did in Marsh and others he argued that certiorari never should have been
granted. Restating the Ratchet, Justice Stevens wrote that “[f]ederal interests
are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for
its citizens than the Federal Constitution requires.”
Last term’s third Ratchet case, Washington v. Recuenco, is also unique
because it did not involve the interpretation of a federal constitutional right,
but rather the question of the correct remedy for a concededly violated right.
While the Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court’s determination
that a Blakely violation is a structural error requiring resentencing, Justice
Stevens again argued that the Court should never have granted certiorari
only to overrule a state court’s decision to afford greater constitutional rights
than the majority thought were required.
It is interesting to ask why Stevens’s Ratchet came up three times during
the Court’s most recent term. Justice Brennan’s Ratchet originated in the
1960s, as part of the Court’s move to expand federal rights and federal powers to combat what it saw as great infringements upon those rights by states.
Justice Stevens, however, is propounding his Ratchet to stop a Court in the
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midst of a program of contracting federal rights and federal powers. If the
Court were to refuse to hear state cases which overextended rights, they
would have fewer chances to roll those rights back. But Stevens’s Ratchet is
much more than just a liberal shield against conservative intervention on the
side of prosecutors in their battles with state courts. It represents a view of
the Supreme Court as an impartial enforcer of individual rights and not as an
active participant in internal state battles. Additionally, it serves as an exhortation to the Supreme Court to refrain from unnecessary lawmaking.
At the core of Stevens’s ratchet is the Justice’s conception of judicial restraint as an interest that does not apply to the merits of judicial
decisionmaking, but to the process. This conception is distinct from the approach to judicial restraint recently expounded upon by Chief Justice
Roberts. In a commencement speech at Georgetown University, Roberts told
graduates that to provide better guidance to lawyers and lower courts, the
Supreme Court should write opinions which embody a high level of consensus. He argued that to achieve that consensus the Court should exercise
restraint and rule as narrowly as possible. Justice Stevens’s process-based
judicial restraint is distinct because it does not focus upon how to decide
cases, but upon which cases actually need deciding. As Justice Stevens explained in a 1982 speech, the Court should not waste its time on cases in
which a state court overprotects federal rights because “the state decision
affect[s] only a limited territory and [does] not create a conflict with any
other decision on a question of federal law, and . . . the state court ha[s] the
power to reinstate its original judgment by relying on state law.”
Justice Stevens’s suggestion that the Court hear fewer cases sounds innocent enough, but his selection of which cases to exclude was enough to
provoke Justice Scalia in Marsh. The idea that states may act as laboratories
of constitutional interpretation is consistent with an important element of
experimentation in our federal system, but it clashes with an equally important element: uniform application of federal law. While Congress and the
Executive have some power to determine what decisions are left to local
actors and which are made at the highest levels of government, the choices
have already been made for those rights enshrined in the Constitution. Justice Scalia argued in his Marsh concurrence that it is the Supreme Court’s
role to ensure that those choices are respected, no matter who stands to
benefit, and Stevens’s Ratchet would insert an improper override to the constitutional division of labor between the states and the federal government.
Even though the federal government would not lose the power to enforce
constitutional rights, it would lose the power to set the boundaries for state
conduct consistent with those rights. The Court would lose the power to
complain when rights are overenforced.
But an exception to the division of power between the states and the
federal government is consistent with the federal government’s constitutional role as protector of individual rights. To enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court should only be concerned when a state does not provide enough due process, not when it provides too much. This is exactly the
one-way ratchet that the Court once applied to Congressional powers under
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Section 5. And like that ratchet, Stevens’s Ratchet would not allow any substantive constitutional interpretation outside the Supreme Court because it
only allows overprotection of rights; it never allows reinterpretations of
them. Because the ratchet can still go the other way, Justice Scalia’s “crazy
quilt” fears are unfounded. Justice Stevens is not making an argument about
how to interpret the Constitution, but when to interpret it.
Justice Stevens’s ratchet demonstrates a unique view of the Court’s role:
the Court should not be a panel of distinguished scholars writing on whatever interesting subjects come their way, but should instead restrict its
efforts to those cases where it is truly needed. The Court’s intervention is
not needed when the courts of Michigan, Kansas, or even Finland provide
more protection to a defendant than she would receive in federal court even
if the protection rests upon constitutional law. As Justice Stevens explained
in a footnote in his Marsh opinion, there is a “separate federal interest in
ensuring that no person be convicted or sentenced in violation of the Federal
Constitution.” Applying Stevens’s Ratchet would take that interest seriously.

